By Alan Zelicoff/
Science Consultant
The U.S. Department of Energy has quietly slipped a new “rule” of great significance into the Code of Federal Regulations: The program of lie-detector “screening” at the premiere national laboratories has been rescinded.
This change reflects an unflattering judgment on positions staked out by a bipartisan collection of political and lab leaders.
First proposed in 1999 by Gov. Bill Richardson — then secretary of energy — during the uproar over alleged spying at the national labs, the lie detector policy elicited the derision of scientists everywhere. The American Psychological Association, the Federation of American Scientists, the Senior Scientists at Sandia Labs and the National Academy of Sciences uniformly rejected the Richardson’s contention that polygraphs would improve security.
The expedient (though hardly inexpensive) attempt to paper over extraordinarily damaging security lapses with polygraphs has failed catastrophically.
On those rare occasions when bad policy-making is repudiated, winners and losers emerge. The winners this time are obvious:
Applicants for jobs at the labs, who will no longer have their careers ruined by flunking a thoroughly disproved test for “deception.”
The labs themselves, as
they may once again be able to
attract top students who have routinely shunned opportunities simply because graduates from top universities realize that any institution that used the polygraph wasn’t exactly a place to build a serious scientific career.
The losers include Rep. Heather Wilson, the then responsible lab managers, Richardson and agencies that continue to rely upon polygraphs.
Wilson, D-N.M., originated the DOE polygraph legislation in 2000 as a member of the House Intelligence Committee. She repeatedly touts her “science and engineering training at the Air Force Academy” as her guiding philosophy. Yet, Wilson ignored all of the scientific literature provided to her on the uselessness of polygraph screening.
Her judgment appears as self-serving rather than the stuff of principled leadership. Since her re-election in this election — perhaps the closest of her career, may be the ticket to a Senate seat, voters should examine her rhetoric and record.
Ex-Sandia President C. Paul Robinson and Director Dori Ellis, charged with maintaining the health and scientific integrity of employees, couldn’t stop the polygraph program. But by putting into place an independent community-based oversight committee — routine at the labs in all processes involving human subjects — the illegal excesses and undermining of careers could have been mitigated. (Testimonials of many lab employees are on my web site: www.zelicoff.com.)
Instead, Robinson and Ellis disciplined lab scientists who called for oversight with career-busting disciplinary suspensions based on “insubordination.”
Richardson announced the polygraph program as his own idea when he headed the DOE. When he visited the national laboratories in 1999, he quite literally waved his hand dismissively in answer to staff questions. “The polygraph is easy to pass if you’ve nothing to hide. I’ve had one. It’s no big deal,” the future governor said, offering a fool’s gambit to some of the country’s best scientists, who weren’t buying his argument then anymore than they do now.
By seeking to maintain his then vice-presidential prospects in the face of security snafus at the DOE, Richardson may be exhibit “A” in incompetent national security policymaking. Perhaps voters’ memories will be long enough to recall Richardson’s malfeasance when he makes another run for national office in 2008.
The agencies that continue to worship the screening polygraph as a counter-intelligence tool — the CIA, and the NSA and others — come out looking silliest by far. Hundreds of perfectly loyal Americans possessing desperately needed skills in Arabic, Persian and other languages have passed through the exacting application requirements for employment in the intelligence community only to have their hopes dashed by “failing” a polygraph.
In the end, it is the American people who pay the biggest price: countless millions spent on feckless technology that has a dismal record of catching spies, yet eliminates the very people we need to protect our freedoms.
Seven years after the Sandia senior scientists’ recommendation, the DOE has reluctantly admitted that it made a mistake by placing reliance in the polygraph. Might other agencies follow? Only an inveterate optimist would so conclude.
Alan Zelicoff, former senior scientist in the Center for National Security and Arms Control at Sandia National Laboratories is a writer, consulting physicist and physician residing in Albuquerque. His latest book is: “Microbe: Are We Ready for the Next Plague?” published by Amacom.
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