OPINION: Toppling leaders is the easy part

I do not need to be convinced that Nicolás Maduro is a bad leader. He hollowed out Venezuela’s democracy, brutalized opponents and presided over the suffering and displacement of millions. To say that plainly is not controversial. What is dangerous is assuming that removing him, by force, will somehow repair what years of repression created.

I write this as a former U.S. diplomat, and as someone who has lived through the consequences of that assumption.

During my service in Lebanon, I witnessed the assassination of Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, and the unraveling that followed. The strike was precise. The target was clear. The aftermath was anything but. What came next was not stability, but uncertainty, space for armed actors, spoilers and regional powers to maneuver, settle scores and deepen cycles of fear. The lesson that stayed with me was that it is possible to remove a leader; it is far harder to manage what rushes in to replace him.

That lesson matters now.

The United States has a long and painful record in Latin America of believing that toppling leaders will lead naturally to democracy. In Chile, Guatemala, Nicaragua and elsewhere, interventions meant to “correct” politics instead weakened institutions and normalized violence. Even when intentions were framed as necessary or urgent, the result was often prolonged instability that ordinary people paid for.

Venezuela is not an abstract problem on a map. It is a large, complex country with a politicized military, armed militias, criminal networks and regional actors watching closely. Capturing a president does not dismantle those structures. It does not answer clearly who governs the day after, how authority is legitimized, or how violence is contained. In my experience, power vacuums do not remain empty for long, and they are rarely filled by moderates.

This is not an argument for indifference. It is an argument for discipline. American power is at its most credible when it is lawful, restrained and multilateral.

The Constitution requires Congress to debate and authorize acts of war not as a formality, but as a moral and strategic check. Those debates force us to confront uncomfortable questions: What is the end state? Who bears responsibility if things collapse? How do we protect civilians when the map of authority shatters?

I have watched what happens when those questions are not answered in advance. In the Middle East, removing figures without securing institutions turned moments into messes. Militias adapted. Civilians suffered. Outside powers exploited the chaos. Each intervention promised resolution and delivered a longer, darker chapter.

Venezuelans deserve better than that.

If the United States wants to support a democratic future in Venezuela, it should do so by strengthening the tools that actually build stability: sustained diplomacy, international coordination, targeted pressure tied to clear benchmarks, humanitarian relief and support for a Venezuelan-led political transition with real guarantees. Those paths are slower. They are also more honest.

Toppling leaders is the easy part. Governing what comes next is the test of wisdom. From Beirut to Caracas, the warning is the same: When force outruns strategy, suffering follows. I hope we remember that, before we make a hard situation irreversible.

Carlo James Aragón is a New Mexico native, a former U.S. diplomat and a public servant who has worked on foreign policy and crisis response in the Middle East. He is a resident of Corrales.