OPINION: Why labeling Muslim Brotherhood 'chapters' a terrorist group is problematic

The White House in November issued a presidential action statement designating certain Muslim Brotherhood “chapters” as terrorist organizations. 

Early this month, the U.S. State Department and U.S. Treasury Department announced the designations of the Lebanese, Jordanian and Egyptian chapters of the Muslim Brotherhood as terrorist organizations. This action was prompted by pressure from the leaders of the United Arab Republic, Jordan, Bahrain and Lebanon to label the MB a terrorist group. 

Having followed the MB and interviewed many of its members for years during my government service, it seems the administration’s decision does not reflect a deep knowledge of the origins of the Muslim Brotherhood and its connection to Muslim societies and political Islam. 

Context

The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood was founded by schoolteacher Hassan al-Banna in 1928 in response to two fundamental realities: First, Egypt was under the influence of British colonialism. Second, under the influence of the pro-Western corrupt monarchy, the MB’s founder believed that Muslim Egypt was drifting away from Islam. Egypt of course is the home of Al-Azhar University, the oldest Muslim academic center of learning in the world. 

Al-Azhar University represents the theological teachings of the three major Schools of Jurisprudence in Sunni Islam — the Hanafi, the Maliki and the Shafi’i Schools. The fourth School of Jurisprudence (the Hanbali), the smallest and the most intolerant, has been adopted by the Wahhabi-Salafi doctrine, prevalent mostly in Saudi Arabia.

The MB was founded on two principles: a) Islam is the solution to society’s ills, and b) Islam is a combination of faith (din), society (dunya) and state (dawla). Al-Banna believed that these principles, especially, the three Arabic Ds, underpin most Sunni Muslim societies, perhaps excluding the Hanbali School.

In the past 98 years, the MB’s ideological construct has undergone various iterations in its relations with Muslim rulers and participating in electoral politics.

Certain MB thinkers and leaders over the past nine decades have adopted a violent view of Islamic jihad and either allied themselves with some Wahhabi clerics in Saudi Arabia or joined al-Qaida. 

In the early 1990s, the Egyptian MB officially rejected political violence and declared its support for peaceful gradual political change through elections. 

Parties not MB 'chapters'

National Islamic parties in different countries adopted the basic theological principles of the MB on the role of Islam in society, but they not “chapters” of the MB. 

They are freestanding Islamic political groups and movements, legally registered in their countries. They often focus on economic, health and social issues of concern to their communities. They are not tied to the MB in command, control, communication or operations. 

Examples of these Sunni Islamic political parties include the AKP in Turkey, the Islamic Action Front in Jordan, Justice and Development in Morocco, al-Nahda in Tunisia, the Islamic Constitutional Movement in Kuwait, the Islamic Movement (RA’AM) in Israel, PAS in Malaysia, PKS in Indonesia, the Islamic Party in Kenya and the National Islamic Front in Sudan.

During my government career, my analysts and I spent years in conversations with representatives of these parties to convince them to moderate their political positions and to enter the mainstream political process through elections. In fact, most of them did just that. They won some elections and lost others, and in the process, they were able to recruit thousands of young members. 

Based on these conversations, we concluded that these groups were pragmatic, mainstream entities, and believed that elections were a process, and not “one man, one vote, one time.” Because they believed in the efficacy and value of gradual peaceful political change, they were able to convince their fellow Muslims that a winning strategy at the polls was to focus on bread-and-butter issues, including health, education and welfare, that were of concern to their own societies. They projected to their members a moderate vision of Islam. 

Labeling the Muslim Brotherhood and other mainstream Sunni Islamic political parties as terrorist organizations could radicalize some of the youth in these parties and sour them on electoral politics. Some national leaders of these parties could also become reticent to engage with American diplomats, intelligence officers and other officials at U.S. embassies. 

Washington inadvertently would be sending a message to Muslim youth that the democratic process and peaceful participation in electoral politics are a sham, which could damage American national security and credibility in many Muslim countries.

Emile Nakhleh is a retired senior intelligence service officer, a founding director of the CIA's Political Islam Strategic Analysis Program and the Global and the National Security Policy Institute at the University of New Mexico. The original article was published in The Cipher Brief.

https://www.thecipherbrief.com/muslim-brotherhood-terrorist-designation-problematic